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Strategy A: Play in the first period. Then, - Choose Cafter any history in which the last period outcome was (CC). - Choose Dafter any other history, that is, if the last period outcome was (CC). Consider now any history in which the outcome in the last period is (CC). Un what conditions on 8 (0.1), if any, does Strategy A constitute a subgame per equilibrium? You need to check the one-shot deviation property when the last per outcome is (CC). D C D 0,0 8,-2 C -2,8 4,4 B) (10 points) Consider the following strategy. Strategy B: Play C in the first period. Then, - Choose after any history in which the last period outcome was (DD) - Choose Dafter any other history, that is, if the last period outcome is not (D, Consider now any history in which the outcome in the last period is (D,D). Und what conditions on 6 (0,1), if any, does Strategy B above constitute a subgame perfe equilibrium? You need to check the one-shot deviation property when the last perio outcome is (DD). D D 0,0 8,-2 C -2,8 4,4 C) (10 points) Consider the following strategy. Strategy X: Play in the first period. Then, - Choose after any history in which the last period outcome is (DC) - Choose Dafter any other history, that is, if the last period outcome is ne (DC). Consider now any history in which the outcome in the last period is (DC). Unde what conditions on 5 (0,1), if any, does Strategy Xabove constitute a subgame perfe equilibrium? You need to check the one-shot deviation property when the last perio outcome is (DC). D 0,0 8,2 C -2,8 4,4 D Strategy A: Play in the first period. Then, - Choose Cafter any history in which the last period outcome was (CC). - Choose Dafter any other history, that is, if the last period outcome was (CC). Consider now any history in which the outcome in the last period is (CC). Un what conditions on 8 (0.1), if any, does Strategy A constitute a subgame per equilibrium? You need to check the one-shot deviation property when the last per outcome is (CC). D C D 0,0 8,-2 C -2,8 4,4 B) (10 points) Consider the following strategy. Strategy B: Play C in the first period. Then, - Choose after any history in which the last period outcome was (DD) - Choose Dafter any other history, that is, if the last period outcome is not (D, Consider now any history in which the outcome in the last period is (D,D). Und what conditions on 6 (0,1), if any, does Strategy B above constitute a subgame perfe equilibrium? You need to check the one-shot deviation property when the last perio outcome is (DD). D D 0,0 8,-2 C -2,8 4,4 C) (10 points) Consider the following strategy. Strategy X: Play in the first period. Then, - Choose after any history in which the last period outcome is (DC) - Choose Dafter any other history, that is, if the last period outcome is ne (DC). Consider now any history in which the outcome in the last period is (DC). Unde what conditions on 5 (0,1), if any, does Strategy Xabove constitute a subgame perfe equilibrium? You need to check the one-shot deviation property when the last perio outcome is (DC). D 0,0 8,2 C -2,8 4,4 D