Voluntary Public Goods game: two players

Does this game have a dominant strategy equilibrium? If so, what is it?

3 Voluntary Public Goods game: two players In order to learn how people actually play in game situations. economists and other social scientists frequently conduct experiments in which subjects play gamma {or money. One such game is known as the voluntary pubis: goods game. This game is chosen to represent situations in which individuals can take actions that are costly to themselves but that are benecial to an entire community. in this problem We will deal with a twaplayer 1.I'ersinn of the Voluntary public goods game. Two players are put in separate rooms. Each player is given $10. The player can use this money in either of two Ways. He can ksep it or he can contribute it to a \"public fund." Money that goes: into the public. Fund gets multiplied by 1.6 and then diviaed equally betWeen the two players. If both contribute their 31o, then each gets heel: Sxi = $l. If one contributes and the other does not. each gets back $lx1f2 = $3 from the public. fund so that the contributor has $8 at the end of the game and the non-contributor has 313bit: original 31G plus $8 back from the public fund. If neither contributes. both have their original SH]. Does this game have a dominant strategy eqrnljbrium? If so1 what is it