What is different with Boeing that makes it so much harder to be successful in your view?

What lessons do you believe Boeing should learn from its experience with the 787 offer for its next plane development effort? Why?

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is a game changer in the aircraft market.' It is the first commercial airliner that doesn't have an aluminum skin. Instead, Boeing designed it to have a composite exterior, which provides a weight savings that allows the plane to use 20 percent less fuel than the 767, the plane It is designed to replace. The Increased fuel efficiency and other design advancements made the 787 very popular with airlines. Boeing received orders for over 900 Dreamliners before the first 787 ever took flight It was also a game changer for Boeing In 2003, when Boeing announced the development of the new plane, It also decided to design and manufacture the 787 in a way that was different from what it had ever done before. In the past, Boeing had internally designed and engineered the major components of its planes. Boeing would then provide detailed engineering designs and specifications to its key suppliers. The suppllers would then build the components to Boeing's specifications. To limit the up-front Investment it would need to make with the 787, Boeing moved to a modular structure and outsourced much of the engineering of the components to suppliers. Boeing provided them with basic specifications and left it to the suppliers to undertake the detailed design, engineering, and manufacturing of components and subsystems. Boeing's operations in Seattle were then responsible for assembling the pieces into a completed aircraft Working with about 50 suppliers on four continents, Boeing found the coordination and integration of the work of suppliers to be very challenging. Some of the contracted supplers didn't have the engineering expertise needed to do the work and outsourced the engineering to subcontractors. This made especially difficult to monitor the engineering work for the plane Jim Abaugh, Boeing's commercial aviation chiet, Identified a core issue with this change in responsibility and stated, "We gave work to people that had never really done this kind of technology before, and we didn't provide the oversight that was necessary." With the geographic stretch of the supplier set, Boeing aso had difficulty monitoring the progress of the supplying firms. Boeing even ended up buying some of the suppliers once it became apparent they couldn't deliver the designs and products on schedule. For example, Boeing spent about $1 billion to acquire the Vought Aircraft Industries unit responsible for the plane's fuselage. When the suppliers finally delivered the parts, Boeing sometimes found they had difficulty assembling or combining the components. With its first 787. I found that the nose section and the fuselage didnt initially for together, leaving a sizable gap between the two sections. To address these issues, Boeing was forced to co-locate many of its major suppliers together for six months to smooth out design and integration issues. In the end, the decision to outsource cost Boeing dearly. The plane was three years behind schedule when the first 787 was delivered to a customer. The entire process took billions of dollars more than originally projected and also more than what it would have cost Boeing to design in-house. In early 2013, all 49 of the 787s that had been delivered to customers were grounded because of concerns about onboard flies in the lithium ion batteries used to power the plane-parts that were not designed by Boeing As Boeing CEO Jim McNerney concluded. "In retrospect, our 787 game plan may have been overly ambitious, incorporating too many firsts all at once-in the application of new technologies, in revolutionary design and build processes, and in increased global sourcing of engineering and manufacturing content