Let's change Example 12.7 (page 423) as follows. With 20 percent probability, Melissa's examination of the care definitely reveals whether or not it's problem free. With 80 percent probability, she learns nothing from her examination. In the latter case, given her uncertainty, she will be willing to pay $6,000, just like Olivia and Elvis. Neither Olivia nor Elvis knows whether Melissa learns anything from her examination. Does Melissa have a weakly dominant strategy? If so, what is it? If Olivia and Elvis bid naively, will they still suffer from the winner's curse? A Ford Mustang is offered for sale through a second-price auction. There are three bidders, Melissa, Olivia, and Elvis. There's a 50 percent chance that the car has a serious mechanical problem, in which case it's worth $2,000 to all bidders, and a 50 percent chance that it's problem-free, in which case it's worth $10,000 Melissa has had an opportunity to inspect the car and knows whether or not it has a problem. Olivia and Elvis have had no such opportunity. Given their uncertainty, they are willing to pay only $6,000, which is the car's expected value. Suppose with 10 percent probability, Melissa's examination of the car definitely reveals whether or not it's problem-free with 90 percent probability, she learns nothing from her examination. In that case, given her uncertainty, she will be willing to pay $6,000, just like Olivia and Elvis. Neither Olivia nor Elvis knows whether Melissa learns anything from her examination. Assume Olivia and Elvis bid naively.