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2. An object is to be allocated among o agents, where my3. For each agent LEN = ( 1, 2 , ..., n), the value of the object is si E 10, 00), where 212 2 2 7 ... 7, ami, 7 am. Each agent iEN makes a bid xiE 10, 0). The highest bidden wins the object and pays histher bid. In case the matt morof highest bidders has more than one agent, the agent with the Lowest andex in H, ie,, Mint, wins the object. The losers pay nothing. (2) Formulate the above scenario as a strategic form game g= ( N, X, M). ( 6) Show that, for each pe [2 2, all, there is a Nash equilibrium xEX with X,= p. ( 6) Find all Nash equilibria of J